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Abstract
The case of strategic advertising response is examined for branded and generic meat products
(beef, pork, and poultry). A dynamic conceptual model is developed to identify the
determinants of advertising expenditures. A time-series model is then used to examine the
competitive behavior of branded and generic meat advertisers. The results identify two types
of advertising strategies; those based upon changes in revenues and those based upon
changes in competitor advertising expenditures. Most groups employ a mix of revenue-based
and advertising-based strategies. The results identify examples of both strategic substitutes
and strategic complements. No long-run response to generic advertising by brand advertisers
in the same commodity group is found.
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1. Introduction 
Millions of dollars are spent each year in the U.S. to advertise meat products.  Many have 
analyzed meat advertising, primarily to determine its impact on consumer demand for meat.  
Fewer have considered how advertising by one group influences another’s advertising.  The 
objective of this research is to explore the nature of the dynamic strategic responses among five 
groups of meat advertisers: brand and generic beef, brand and generic pork, and brand poultry.  
The primary focus is on understanding how competitor advertising and revenues influence a 
firm’s advertising expenditures rather than how advertising impacts consumer demand.  This 
paper represents an important contribution to the literature as a first look at strategic responses in 
a complex advertising arena comprised of industry-level advertising (generic) and firm-level 
advertisers (brand). 
The case of meat advertising is particularly interesting.  Considerable amounts of both 
branded and generic advertising expenditures are made for pork and beef products while poultry 
advertising expenditures are used to promote branded products.  The competitive dynamics 
between brand and generic advertising are not well understood.  Some previous research has 
considered the interaction between generic advertising and branded advertising of the same 
commodity (e.g., Krishnamurthy, 2000) or between generic advertising of different commodities 
(e.g., Alston, Freebairn, and James, 2001).   
  In the case of meat advertising the relationships between brand and generic advertising 
are complicated by cross commodity effects because meat commodity groups are typically 
viewed as substitutes.  As a result, the generic (and possibly brand) promotional activities of 
firms in one commodity group may influence the demand faced by other commodity groups.  
Carey and Bolton (1996) showed that collective (generic) advertising decisions may depend 
upon the level of spillovers that exists between firms.  Analyses of the significance of spillover 
impacts of meat advertising have been inconclusive (Kinnucan, 1996; Kinnucan and Miao, 2000; 
and Kinnucan, Xiao, and Hsia, 1996). 
  It is clear that a variety of factors influence strategic advertising behavior.  In the case of 
meat advertising it is likely that these behaviors will be influenced by the presence of generic and 
brand advertising, spillover effects of advertising, and responses to changes in market shares 
(Lim and Ong, 1989; Thomas, 1999).  The following section develops a conceptual model of the 
factors influencing strategic advertising behavior.  Then, an empirical model that captures the 
behavior implied by the conceptual model is developed and estimated.   
 
2. Conceptual Model 
  Most related studies have established a static game theory model to develop advertising 
reaction functions.  See for instance Alston, Freebairn, and James (2000); Lim and Ong (1989); 
and Boyer and Moreaux (1999).  Tirole (1989) provides a static representation of the reaction 
function.  In his static case, the Nash equilibrium is always achieved and in no time period do the 
firms deviate from that point.  However, he points out that the problem becomes more complex 
under dynamic conditions.  It is further complicated when there are more than two firms in the 
market.  Here, we develop the static, two-firm model.  We then introduce dynamics into the 
model.  Finally, we discuss the dynamic, n-firm conceptual problem. 
 
2.1 Static, Two-Firm Reaction Functions 
Consider Firm 1, who behaves as a profit-maximizer, choosing advertising expenditures.  
Firm 1’s profit function can be characterized as follows,    2 
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where a1 and a2 are advertising expenditures by Firms 1 and 2.  Firm 1’s optimal advertising 
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  Assuming a negative denominator (indicating decreasing marginal returns to advertising), 
the sign of the slope of the reaction function is determined by the cross-partial in the numerator.  
Tirole (1989) and Varian (1992) point out that if the numerator is positive, then the actions are 
“strategic complements.”  In this case, increased advertising expenditures by the rival firm leads 
to an increase in own advertising.  If negative, then the actions are “strategic substitutes.”  
 
2.2 Dynamic, Two-Firm Reaction Functions 
  Now consider the case in which profits are a function of current and lagged advertising.  
Also, advertising expenditures are a function of lagged revenues, which provide a pool of 
resources to be used for advertising and other promotional activities.  In this case, Firm 1’s profit 
function in period t is 
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where G is the revenue of the firm.  The effects of advertising impact profits for m  and 
k periods for Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively.  Also, advertising is a function of lagged revenues, 
whose effects last for n and l periods, respectively. 
  Solving the first-order conditions for the optimal advertising level for Firm 1 in period t, 
*
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where an asterisk represents the optimal choices for each firm in period t.  In other words, Firm 1 
chooses its advertising expenditures based upon its own past advertising and revenues as well as 
its rival’s past advertising and revenues. 
 
2.3 Dynamic, n-Firm Reaction Functions 
  The dynamic reaction function in the n-firm case follows directly from Equation 4.  Firm 
1 would choose its advertising expenditures based jointly upon each rivals’ lagged advertising 
and revenues, illustrating the dynamic nature of the problem of estimating firm reaction 
functions.  Static analyses do not capture the strategic interactions that may exist.  Therefore, we 
employ a time-series approach which allows us to specify a dynamic model and estimate both 
short- and long-run responses between meat advertisers.   
 
3. Empirical Model 
  Our analysis employs a vector autoregression (VAR) estimation framework.  The general 
form of the VAR model is shown in Equation 5.   3 
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Here, yt is an n x 1 vector of current period advertising expenditures and yt-1 through yt-p are the 
first through the p
th lags of advertising expenditures.  The xt-i are n x 1 vectors of lagged retail 
revenues.  The Γ and β matrices are coefficients to be estimated using a system of seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR).  Each of the n equations in the system includes the same set of 
independent variables.  Thus, the coefficient estimates are the same as would be obtained with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) equations estimated individually.  Estimating the equations within 
an SUR system incorporates the assumption that the errors, εt, are uncorrelated with yt-p-j, where j 
> 0, i.e., p lags of the dependent variables are sufficient to explain the dynamics found in y 
(Hamilton, 1994).  The lag structure, including the choice of p, is an empirical concern. 
  Once the coefficients in Γ and β have been estimated, they can be used to calculate 
dynamic multipliers, which map out impulse-response functions and long-run multipliers for 
each equation.  The dynamic multipliers show the affect of a one-unit change r periods in the 
past on the current period’s value of advertising expenditures or, conversely, they can show the 
impact of a one-unit shock today on advertising expenditures r periods in the future.  The long-
run multiplier shows the total impact of the one-unit shock after its effects completely work 
through the system.  For details on calculating dynamic and long-run multipliers, the interested 
reader should see Hyde and Foster (2003).  Note that we convert the multipliers to elasticity 
values by multiplying the multiplier by the relevant ratio of sample means.   
 
4. Data 
  The data used for this study are quarterly and cover the period of 1970-1993
1.  The data 
include advertising expenditures for beef (brand and generic), pork (brand and generic), and 
poultry (brand only) from Class/Brand QTR $ (Leading National Advertisers, 1970-1994).  Per 
capita meat consumption data were obtained from the Livestock and Meat Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, 1970-1994), price indices for the meat commodities were obtained from 
CPI Detailed Reports (USDL/BLS, various years), and population statistics were obtained from 
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Survey of Current Business (BEA, 1986-1994). 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics and variable definitions 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Beeftr  Indexed per capita beef retail revenues  1752  410  912  2356 
Porktr  Indexed per capita pork retail revenues  1190  343  611  1871 
Pltrytr  Indexed per capita poultry retail 
revenues 
1600  723  516  3190 
Bbadv  Per capita branded beef advertising  2.4  2.7  0.0  12.5 
Gbadv  Per capita generic beef advertising  9.4  13.7  0.1  56.6 
Bpadv  Per capita branded pork advertising  32.5  17.5  7.3  85.2 
Gpadv  Per capita generic pork advertising  3.2  4.3  0.0  16.2 
Cadv  Per capita poultry advertising (branded)  29.4  19.6  2.7  86.3 
 
  Variables representing meat revenues were created by multiplying the price indices by 
per-capita meat consumption.  Because the meat consumption data are reported on a per-capita 
                                                 
1 The data were used by Brester and Schroeder (1995).  We appreciate their making the data available for this 
research.   4 
basis, the advertising expenditures were divided by population for consistency among the data.  
The definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 
1.  The dependent variable for each equation was one of the five advertising expenditure 
variables described in Table 1.  The independent variables included lags of those five variables 
as well as lagged indexed retail revenues for all three meats and dummy variables representing 
quarters 2, 3, and 4. 
 
5. Results 
  Results are presented in two sections.  First, the short-run effects, including the 
coefficient estimates and the impulse response functions, are presented and discussed.  The 
second section presents the long-run effects, including the long-run elasticities and the results of 
Granger causality tests. 
  To determine the appropriate lag structure, a model that included the first through the 
fourth lags of the endogenous (predetermined) and exogenous variables was estimated.  
Likelihood ratio tests were used to specify the appropriate lag length and structure.  The tests 
resulted in specifications that included the first and fourth lags of the predetermined and 
exogenous variables as well as the quarterly dummy variables.  Thus each of these variables was 
included as independent variables in each of the five equations estimated. 
 
Table 2.  Parameter estimates for the vector autoregression model
a 
  Equation 
Variable  BBADV  GBADV  BPADV  GPADV  CADV 
Constant  -3.060*  1.074  4.566  -1.758  -16.248** 
BBADVt-1  0.352**  0.249  0.066  -0.076  0.710 
BBADVt-4  0.410**  0.066  0.422  0.035  0.715 
GBADVt-1  -0.009  0.491**  -0.196*  -0.040*  0.096 
GBADVt-4  -0.023  0.120  -0.128  0.030  0.197* 
BPADVt-1  -0.061**  -0.008  0.156  -0.069**  0.098 
BPADVt-4  0.054**  -0.001  0.269**  -0.019  -0.045 
GPADVt-1  0.034  0.429  0.095  -0.231*  -1.407** 
GPADVt-4  -0.047  -1.981**  0.092  0.035  -0.492 
CADVt-1  -0.032  -0.114  0.166*  -0.012  0.200** 
CADVt-4  0.012  0.020  0.156  0.009  0.453** 
BEEFTRt-1  -0.005*  -0.029**  0.006  -0.010**  0.004 
BEEFTRt-4  0.005*  0.008  -0.023  -0.005*  -0.008 
PORKTRt-1  0.009**  0.020  -0.013  0.010**  0.015 
PORKTRt-4  -0.001  -0.013  0.035*  0.010**  0.002 
PLTRYTRt-1  -0.002  0.017*  -0.006  0.004**  0.007 
PLTRYTRt-4  -0.002  0.006  0.013  0.003*  -0.002 
D2  -0.191  2.402  1.817  0.511  6.879* 
D3  0.790  -1.306  -1.845  1.130  4.785 
D4  -0.721  1.639  4.900  -0.190  10.423** 
R
2  =  0.771  0.795  0.860  0.908  0.891 
Durbin’s h  -0.435  -0.375  -0.614  -0.529  -0.334 
* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance 
a Estimated equations are represented in the columns of this table. 
Notes: System R
2 = 0.99.  D2-D4 represent quarterly dummies indicating second, third, and fourth quarters.   5 
 
  In general, the individual equations explain much of the variation in the dependent 
variables, with each R
2 greater than 0.77.  The system R
2 is 0.99, and the system is shown to be 
stable, as the greatest eigenvalue of the Π0 matrix is 0.901.  Furthermore, the errors were 
analyzed for potential autocorrelation using Durbin’s h test (Harvey, 1981).  For each equation, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the errors are asymptotically normally distributed.   
 
5.1 Short-Run Effects - VAR Results and Impulse Response Functions 
  Turning attention to individual equations and associated impulse response functions, the 
VAR results are presented in Table 2 and the impulse response functions are presented in Figures 
1-6.  For the sake of brevity, we present and discuss only those relationships in which at least one 
of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero.  These are denoted as 
relationships that are statistically significant in the short-run.  It is important to note that short-
run significance is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the long-run significance of a 
given relationship.  Below, we summarize short-run results in three categories; intra-group 
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Figure 1. Impulse response functions related to brand beef advertising 
 
5.1.1 Short-Run Intra-Group Effects 
With respect to the intra-group effects, all groups except GPADV have at least one 
positive, significant coefficient and no negative, significant ones.  BBADV, GBADV, and 
CADV have a significantly positive first lag of own advertising while BBADV, BPADV and 
CADV have a significantly positive fourth lag.  Thus, it appears that the groups tend to increase 
own advertising when experiencing an initial positive shock.  With regard to the brand   6 
advertising groups, this may well be due to intra-group advertising dynamics, although our 
aggregate data constrain us from testing this hypothesis.  For GBADV, this might be an 
indication that the initial advertising shock was successful in increasing sales and, therefore, the 

































GBADV GPADV BEEFTR PLTRYTR  
Figure 2. Impulse response functions related to generic beef advertising 
 
5.1.2 Short-Run Cross-Group Effects 
  The cross-group effects are more complex.  However, it is clear that most responses 
occur within one period of a shock.  Of the eight cross-group relationships in the figures, five are 
initially negative.  Those indicate the equations in which the first lag of the associated variable 
was negative and statistically significant.  Of the three that were positive, only one was 
statistically significant.  Looking at the coefficients on the fourth lags of the associated variables, 
only three are statistically significant, with two positive and one negative.  Thus, it appears that 
most groups respond quickly to an increase in advertising by other groups, but the response is 
typically to reduce advertising expenditures.  This may be some indication that the groups 
attempt to determine the impact of the advertising shock before developing an appropriate 
response.  It may also indicate a strategy of simply accommodating the shock by either 
decreasing or making no change to expenditures. 
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GBADV BPADV GPADV   
Figure 4. Impulse response functions relating advertising variables to generic pork advertising 
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GBADV GPADV CADV  
Figure 6. Impulse response functions related to poultry advertising 
   9 
5.1.3 Short-Run Revenue Effects 
  Finally, four out of five advertising groups (poultry being the exception) are shown to 
respond to meat revenues in some fashion.  Each of those responds to its own revenues, although 
the nature of that response differs across groups.  In the BBADV equation, the first lag of 
BEEFTR is negative while the fourth is positive.  For GBADV, the first lag of BEEFTR is 
negative and the fourth is insignificant.  Furthermore, both lags of PORKTR are positive in the 
GPADV equation.  Finally, the first lag of PORKTR is insignificant in the BPADV equation, 
while the fourth lag is positive.  Based on these results, it is difficult to draw any general 
conclusions about the nature of the short-run response of advertisers to their own retail revenues. 
  There are a few interesting cross-group revenue relationships.  For example, GPADV is 
shown to decline with positive shocks in BEEFTR.  All else being equal, this might reflect a 
capitulation or may simply be a result of reduced funds if consumers are shifting meat 
expenditures to beef at the expense of pork.  However, GPADV increases with positive shocks in 
PLTRYTR.  GBADV also responds positively to shocks in PLTRYTR.  Thus, it appears that 
generic advertisers increase expenditures when poultry revenues increase.  This is a direct 
competitive move.   
 
5.2 Long-Run Elasticities  
  As noted earlier, it is not always possible to correctly infer a significant long-run strategic 
relationship based solely on short-run dynamics.  Therefore, it is important to consider the 
longer-term responses separately from those of the short-run.  Here, the long-run effects are 
described as those which reflect the total impact of a shock after its effects are completely 
dissipated.  In the following discussion, we focus on these long-run elasticities.  As in the 
previous section, we discuss intra-group, cross-group, and revenue effects. 
 
5.2.1 Long-Run Intra-Group Effects 
Of the five intra-group long-run elasticities, four are positive and statistically significant with 
elasticities that range from 0.83 (BPADV) to 1.47 (BBADV) (Table 3).  The one exception, 
GPADV, is not surprising given the short-run effects noted previously.  However, it is interesting 
to note that although the coefficient on the first lag of GPADV is significant (Table 2), the 
longer-term dynamics (cycling around zero in Figure 4) cause the long-run effect to be 
statistically insignificant.   
 
5.2.2 Long-Run Cross-Group Effects 
Most of the long-run elasticities are consistent with short-run effects discussed above.  There are 
seven statistically significant cross-group long-run elasticities (Table 3).  Three of these are 
positive.  Following Tirole’s (1989) definition, a positive long-run elasticity indicates that the 
actions are strategic complements.  The other four, then, are negative, indicating that the actions 
are strategic substitutes.   
  Neither BBADV nor GBADV have a strategic complement.  One possible explanation 
suggests that pork or poultry advertising has little impact on the consumption of beef or actually 
might lead consumers to purchase more beef.  This would occur if consumers purchased beef 
products while at the meat counter as a result of another group’s advertising. 
   10 
Table 3. Long-run elasticity of meat advertising with respect to indicated advertising expenditure 
source
a 
Source  Brand beef  Generic beef  Brand pork  Generic pork  Poultry 
Brand beef  1.47*,
b  0.25  0.69  -0.61  1.27*
,b 





Brand pork  0.78
b  0.76  0.83*
,b  -1.36*
,b  0.74 
Generic pork  -1.75  -0.67*
,b  -0.07  -0.10
b  -0.49*
,b 
Poultry  -2.33  -1.23  1.28*
,b  -0.92  1.51*
,b 
* = 5% significance 
a Entries in table represent εij where i is the column and j is the row.  For example, the elasticity of generic beef 
advertising with respect to brand beef advertising is 0.25. 
b Indicates a statistically significant test for Granger causality 
 
  The generic advertising groups (GBADV and GPADV) do not view any other advertising 
as strategic complements.  Results indicate that GBADV treats GPADV as a strategic substitute 
and GPADV treats BPADV as a substitute.  These results might indicate that generic advertising 
expenditures increase only when the relevant commodity group feels that other groups (brand or 
generic) are not advertising to the extent that they should and thus the spillover effects are 
absent. 
  The long-run elasticities also point out that responses are not symmetric across 
commodities.  For example, CADV responds to GPADV as a strategic substitute.  However, 
BPADV responds to CADV as a strategic complement.  This is further evidence that generic and 
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Figure 7.  Impulse response function of BBADV with respect to BPADV and CADV with 
respect to BBADV 
 
  With respect to Krishnamurthy’s (2000) analytical model, there is no long-run evidence 
of responses by brand advertising to generic advertising within the same commodity group.    11 
Both long-run elasticities relating own-commodity generic advertising to brand advertising are 
negative, but statistically insignificant.  Thus, although one could hypothesize either a strategic 
substitute or strategic complement relationship, neither is shown to hold in the long-run in these 
data. 
  There are two special cases in which the short-run effects are inconsistent with the long-
run elasticities (Figure 7).  First, BBADV is shown to have no statistically significant long-run 
response to BPADV despite coefficients on the first and fourth lags of BPADV being significant 
in the BBADV equation.  In that case, the first lag was negative and the fourth lag is positive, but 
both are of similar magnitude.  It appears that the short-run dynamic effects offset each other 
over the longer term, resulting in no significant long-run impacts. 
  Second, the long-run elasticity of BBADV in the CADV equation is positive and 
statistically significant at a five percent level, despite both coefficients being insignificant at a 
ten percent level.  Figure 7 shows that the impulse response function is strictly positive.  Thus, it 
appears that the sum of many small impacts, in a statistical sense, adds up to an important impact 
over the long-run. 
 
5.2.3 Long-Run Revenue Effects 
There are five significant long-run elasticities relating changes in revenues to changes in 
advertising expenditures (Table 4).  Interestingly, only GPADV responds to own-commodity 
revenues, with a one percent increase in retail revenues resulting in a five percent long-run 
increase in GPADV.  Although BBADV showed a short-run response to BEEFTR, the long-run 
elasticity is statistically insignificant (Figure 8).  This is another example in which the dynamic 
cycling pattern around zero results in a net effect of no significant change. 
 
Table 4. Long-run elasticity of meat advertising with respect to indicated meat revenue
a 
Revenue  Brand beef  Generic beef  Brand pork  Generic pork  Poultry 
Beef  0.04
b  -2.62
b  -6.68  -0.18**
,b  2.43 
Pork  11.51
b  -2.22  2.06  5.00**
,b  4.82 
Poultry  -7.39*  4.88**
,b  4.97  2.80**
,b  -3.78 
* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance 
a Entries in table represent εij where i is the column and j is the row.  For example, the elasticity of brand beef 
advertising with respect to beef revenues is 0.04. 
b Indicates a statistically significant test for Granger causality 
 
  Note the responses by BBADV and GBADV to PLTRYTR.  Brand beef advertisers are 
shown to decrease expenditures in response to increases in poultry revenues while generic beef 
advertising expenditures increase.  Strategically, beef advertisers may view threats from the 
poultry industry as damaging beef producers and processors as a whole.  Thus, generic 
advertising could be viewed as the appropriate strategic tool in such a case. 
  Generic pork advertising is shown to respond to revenues of all three commodity groups.  
We discussed the response to own revenues earlier.  There is a weak negative response to beef 
revenues, but a strong positive response to poultry revenues.  Thus, both generic beef and generic 
pork advertising respond positively to increases in PLTRYTR in the long-run.  As posited 
earlier, it may be that generic advertising is the best strategic tool for one commodity group to 
combat another 
  Finally, poultry advertising does not respond to any revenue signals in a significant 
manner.  It appears, therefore, that poultry advertisers do not account for changes in market   12 
position when developing their advertising strategies.  Rather, they have a purely advertising-
based strategy, responding to other commodity groups’ changes in advertising expenditures.  The 
same is true of branded pork advertising.  All others, however, employ a mixed strategy based on 






















Figure 8.  Impulse response function of BBADV with respect to BEEFTR 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
  The analysis employed in this paper sheds light on the dynamic relationships between 
groups of meat advertisers.  A time series econometric approach was employed to assess both 
short and long-run strategic responses by advertisers to other groups of advertisers or to retail 
meat revenues.  In general, our results provide evidence of significant short and long-term 
strategic responses.  A list of some of the more interesting findings includes the following. 
·  In the short-run, most groups respond quickly to other groups’ advertising, but that 
response is frequently negative. 
·  There is no clear pattern indicating how a group responds to shocks in its own revenue 
·  Generic beef and pork advertisers seem to respond positively to changes in poultry 
industry revenues; presumably in direct competition. 
·  Generic advertisers appear to advertise only when others are not advertising at a high 
level. 
·  Poultry advertisers appear to follow a purely advertising-based strategy, failing to 
respond to changes in revenues of other industries. 
Taken together, these results suggest clearly that the strategic relationships between 
poultry and either beef or pork are different from that of the beef-pork relationship.  Given that 
poultry does not have a generic advertising campaign, this makes some sense.  Our interpretation 
of some results suggests that generic advertisers increase advertising when overall industry 
advertising is low.  Because poultry does not have that, it might behave differently toward the 
other industries.    13 
This research builds off earlier studies by Hyde and Foster (2003), who found evidence 
of strategic responses in pork advertising.  Also, the results found here provide an empirical test 
of Krishnamurthy’s (2000) analytical model.  There, it was shown that brand advertising may 
increase in response to increases in generic advertising in order to gather a share of the 
expanding market.  Our results, however, show no long-run response to generic advertising by 
brand advertisers. 
The main contribution of this paper is that it provides a first look at meat industry 
advertising dynamics.  Analysis of this sort, which provides a long-run view via time-series 
methods, is absent from the current literature.  Although this work represents an important first 
step in understanding advertising dynamics in the meat industry, it does have a few data issues 
that should be addressed.  The study relies on aggregate data.  While it is certainly the case that 
advertising strategies are set at the firm level, analogous firm-level data are not available.  Firm-
level advertising data would provide a clearer indication of the presence of strategic responses, 
but this is left for further research.  Additionally, the analysis could be made more contemporary 
if more recent data, which are very costly to collect, were to be used. 
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